Russia’s New Security Strategy: Deter U.S., Ignore EU, Partner with China and India
(Russia Matters – russiamatters.org – Simon Saradzhyan – July 15, 2021)
Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of Russia Matters.
While taking pains to formulate Russia’s national security priorities in relations with other countries, overall, the 2021 strategy appears to prioritize the development of domestic components of national security significantly more than the preceding version. One section, entitled “National interests of the Russian Federation and strategic national priorities,” starts with a description of national priorities, the first of which is the “preservation of the people of Russia and the development of human capital,” and discusses at length how to retain and improve the quality and quantity of that capital in Russia. That subsection is followed by “Defense of the country” and then “State and public security.”
In contrast, the national interest section in the 2015 document contained no references to the “preservation of the people of Russia.” It did contain subsections on defense and public security and these were followed by a subsection entitled “Increasing the quality of life of Russian citizens.” Also, the 2015 document lauded population growth in Russia, while the 2021 strategy contains no such language, implicitly acknowledging that, after nearly a decade of population growth, depopulation has resumed in Putin’s Russia.
The 2021 document assigns less priority to the democratization of Russia. The very first national interests it identifies are the “preservation of the people of Russia, developing human potential and improving the quality of life and well-being of citizens”; in contrast, the 2015 document explicitly mentioned democratization (albeit only once) among the first national interests listed: the “strengthening of national accord, political and social stability, the development of democratic institutions and the improvement of mechanisms of interaction between the state and civil society.” The 2021 strategy’s sole reference to democracy is contained in the section on “Russia in the modern world,” which makes clear that democracy has to conform to what the Kremlin is fond of describing as traditional values: “The preservation of Russian identity, culture, traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the patriotic education of citizens will contribute to the further development of democratic order in the Russian Federation and its openness to the world.”
Overall, one can’t help getting the impression that the 2021 document is distinctly more inward-looking than the preceding version, even though the Security Council—which typically plays the lead role in drafting such strategies and which remains a bastion of Russian conservatism under Nikolai Patrushev—has acquired a new, less conservative senior figure since 2015: former president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, who has been the deputy chairman since 2020.
The table below provides a comparison of the two strategies’ key points.
2021 Strategy | 2015 Strategy |
Section II “Russia in the modern world” | |
Starts with an assertion that the world is undergoing a “period of transformation” and refers to the “aspiration of Western countries to retain their hegemony.” | Starts with a description of state policy for national security and uses milder language to describe the “aspirations” of the U.S. and its allies to “retain their domination in world affairs”; notably, does not include explicit accusations of hegemonic intent. |
Refers to “growing geopolitical instability and proneness to conflict.” | Refers to “growing global and regional instability.” |
Contains no references to the growth of Russia’s population, which is not surprising given the recent resumption of depopulation. | Lauds the “natural growth” of the Russian population. |
Accuses “certain states” of encouraging “processes of disintegration” in the Commonwealth of Independent States. | N/A |
Refers to “the danger of the escalation of armed conflicts into local and regional wars, including those involving nuclear powers.” | N/A |
Refers to “the desire [of certain countries] to isolate the Russian Federation.” | N/A |
Refers to “the crisis of the Western liberal model.” | N/A |
Section III “National interests of the Russian Federation and strategic national priorities” | |
Identifies the following national interests:
|
Identifies the following national interests:
|
Starts with a description of national priorities, the first of which is the “preservation of the people of Russia and development of human capital”; also contains a lengthy discussion of how to retain and improve the quality and quantity of human capital in Russia, followed by subsections on “defense of the country” and “state and public security.” | Contains no references to the “preservation of the people of Russia”; starts with a subsection on “defense of the country,” followed by one on “state and public security,” and only then comes a subsection on “increasing the quality of life of Russian citizens.”
|
Contains a subsection on information security. | Does not contain a subsection on information security. |
Contains a subsection on the “protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, culture and historic memory.” | Does not contain a subsection on the “protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, culture and historic memory.” |
Like the strategy as a whole, contains no language calling for the development of relations with the European Union, the United States or NATO.
|
Contains language that does call for the development of relations with the European Union, the United States and NATO:
“The Russian Federation advocates the consolidation of mutually beneficial cooperation with European states and the European Union, the harmonization of integration processes in Europe and on post-Soviet territory, and the formation in the Euro-Atlantic region of an open system of collective security on a clear treaty and legal basis.” “The Russian Federation is interested in establishing full-fledged partnership with the United States of America on the basis of coinciding interests, including the economic sphere, and with regard to the key influence of Russo-American relations on the state of the international situation as a whole. The improvement of the mechanisms of arms control specified by international treaties, confidence-building measures, the solution of questions involving the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, expanded cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the settlement of regional conflicts remain the most important areas of this partnership.” “The Russian Federation is prepared for the development of relations with NATO based on equality for the purpose of strengthening general security in the Euro-Atlantic region. The depth and content of such relations will be determined by the readiness of the alliance to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation when conducting military-political planning, and to respect the provisions of international law.” |
References to US, NATO, EU and China | |
The strategy contains at least four references to the United States, all of which are critical in tone:
|
The strategy contains at least five references to the United States (of which four are critical, while one calls for cooperation with the United States):
|
The strategy contains no references to the European Union. | The strategy contains at least three references to the European Union (of which two are critical, while one calls for cooperation with the European Union):
|
The strategy contains at least one reference to NATO and it is critical: Exacerbation of “military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation is facilitated by attempts to exert pressure on Russia, its allies and partners, building up the military infrastructure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization near Russian borders, stepping up intelligence activities and practicing the use of large military formations and nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation.”
|
The strategy contains at least four references to NATO, of which three are critical and one calls for the development of relations with NATO:
|
The strategy contains at least three references to China, welcoming:
2-3. “Deepening multi-faceted cooperation with foreign states in the formats of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, strengthening the functional and institutional foundations of interaction within the RIC (Russia, India, China).” |
The strategy contains at least three references to China (all call for cooperation):
3. “The Russian Federation is developing relations of all-embracing partnership and strategic cooperation with the Chinese People’s Republic, regarding them as a key factor of the maintenance of global and regional stability.” |
The strategy contains at least two references to India, welcoming:
2-3. “Deepening multi-faceted cooperation with foreign states in the formats of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, strengthening the functional and institutional foundations of interaction within the RIC (Russia, India, China).” |
The strategy contains at least three references to India:
|
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