Do U.S.-Russian Relations Have a Future in Northeast Asia?
(Thomas Graham – Thomas Graham, a senior fellow at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, Yale University, was the senior director for Russia on the U.S. National Security Council staff 2004-2007.- A Russian version of this ran in Ekspert, Nov. 16, 2012 ttp://expert.ru/expert/2012/46/gde-iskat-buduschee/?n=87778)
Does U.S.-Russian cooperation have a future? After the initial warming trend of the first years of the Obama administration, relations are once again under stress – over missile defense; the Middle East, particularly Syria; the political situation in Russia; and American interference in Russian domestic affairs. The achievements of recent years have not only faded. It is not clear they will have any lasting results. The new START was only a way station for the Obama administration toward further cuts in strategic weapons (which are of little, if any, interest to Russia). Russia has made it clear it will not support further UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, as Iran continues to move toward a nuclear-weapons capability. Whatever benefit the United States gains from Russian support for the Northern Distribution Network into Afghanistan will end once it withdraws its forces in 2014. While Russia may benefit from entry into the World Trade Organization, an exponential increase in bilateral U.S.-Russian trade and investment is not in the offing.
Many in the United States attribute the deterioration in relations to Putin’s return to the Kremlin as president. And certainly he has a more skeptical attitude toward the United States than Medvedev does, born of a bitter experience in dealing with the Bush administration. Russians might note that the ongoing political campaign in the United States creates a hostile atmosphere, as the Obama administration offers a less than enthusiastic and compelling defense of its “reset” and Republican candidate Romney asserts that Russia remains America’s “number one geopolitical foe.”
But the fundamental problem lies elsewhere, beyond personalities and election campaigns, and boils down to this: the lack of an agreed strategic framework for relations. The two sides have yet to agree on what of strategic significance they should do together for mutual benefit over the long term. Each side talks of shared issues, but neither gives much public voice to the differences in salience and assessments that divide the two sides on specific issues and the inevitability of trade-offs across issues to foster broader cooperation. Each side wants the other to support its agenda or cease steps to thwart its advance, but neither side knows what it wants long term from the other that would also reasonably accommodate the other’s interests and priorities or what it is prepared to concede to further its own strategic priorities.
How would one go about building a strategic framework? The starting point is today’s turbulent world and the inevitable emergence of a new global equilibrium at some uncertain point in the future. That new equilibrium will be based on a set of regional equilibria, among which the most important ones will be in Eurasia writ large – Europe, the Middle East, Central/South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Arctic. Is there sufficient overlap in American and Russian strategic interests in the character of those regional equilibria to provide a basis for long-term cooperation?
Among the various regions in need of a new equilibrium, Europe offers perhaps the least promise for an initial discussion of a strategic framework. It is too fraught with bitter memories of U.S.-Russian confrontation, too susceptible to stereotypical thinking, too freighted with sterile debates over European security architecture and arms control regimes.
Of the other possibilities, Northeast Asia is perhaps the most attractive. It is a region of great dynamism and fluidity, a region of permanent strategic interest to the United States since it emerged as a great power more than a century ago and a region to which Russia wants to return after the withdrawal and neglect of the initial post-Soviet period. It is home to China, which presents a strategic puzzle of immense proportion and consequence to both the United States and Russia, no matter how it develops in the next few decades. Most important, little thought has been given to U.S.-Russian relations in this region. Tellingly, in her article from November 2011 on “America’s Pacific Century,” Secretary of State Clinton did not mention Russia once. There is, as a result, much room for fresh and creative thinking, and a first step might be putting Russia on American policy-makers’ mental map of Northeast Asia.
The Strategic Importance of Northeast Asia
The strategic importance of Northeast Asia cannot be overstated. A few data points underscore how large it looms in global affairs. The core countries – China, Japan, and South Korea – are the second, third, and fifteen largest economies in the world in nominal terms, or the second, fourth, and thirteenth by purchasing power parity. Together, they account for over 20 percent of global GDP. They are among the top ten trading states, accounting for over 20 percent of global trade.
China, Japan, and South Korea are not just large economies, however; they are also cohesive nation-states, with a profound sense of self and national pride. Nationalism is on the rise in all three. All three have historically had troubled relations with one another, and China and Japan see each other as strategic rivals. The three are among the top countries in military spending, accounting for about 15 percent of global military expenditures. And their militaries are designed for defense against one another. Tensions can erupt quickly over seemingly minor matters, witness the recent squabble over the small uninhabited islands the Japanese call Senkakus and the Chinese Diaoyus. Moreover, Korea is divided, the North has nuclear-weapons programs built on a moribund economy, and effective multilateral structures to tame or moderate ambitions are lacking. Together, these geopolitical realities make Northeast Asia one of the most dynamic and dangerous regions in the world today. War may be improbable, but it is certainly conceivable.
Russia: the Opportunities and Challenges of Integration
For Russia, the attraction of a vibrant Northeast Asia is irresistible. It offers an opportunity to partake of the region’s economic dynamism and a foundation for the socio-economic revival of Russia’s regions east of Lake Baykal. A growing commercial presence there will reduce Russia’s dependence on Europe as a trading partner (Europe now accounts for about 50 percent of Russia’s overall trade), providing both increased leverage in negotiations and a hedge against deteriorating economic conditions in Europe. A large Russian role in Northeast Asia reinforces claims to great-power status and a global role, while China looms as a strategic counterweight to the United States and a partner in containing American influence in Central Asia. The elaboration in 2009 of a strategy for the socio-economic development of the regions east of Lake Baykal, the creation of a federal ministry for development of the Far East in 2012, and Russia’s hosting of the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok all attest to Russia’s determination to rebuild its presence in Northeast Asia.
But the historic opportunity comes with large challenges. At present, Russia faces much more populous states with more advanced or dynamic economies. The fewer than eight million Russians living east of Lake Baykal face over 130 million Chinese in four provinces in Northeast Asia (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, and Inner Mongolia), over 125 million Japanese, and some 75 million Koreans (in both the North and South). Japan and South Korea produce high-technology products with global reputations, while China assembles a wide-range of high-technology goods for world markets. Moreover, the core countries are Asian culturally, whereas the Russians – at least from the standpoint of the Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans – are unequivocally Europeans.
Relations with China may be, as Putin said, at “an unprecedented high, marked by great mutual trust in political and economic matters,” but Russia cannot feel strategically comfortable sharing a long border with a country with which it has historically had territorial disputes (even if the border was fully demarcated in 2008) that has a population over nine times larger and an economy four times larger – and potentially more technologically advanced in the not-too-distant future, if not already – with both the population and economic gap likely to grow in coming years. The unbalanced economic relationship increases China’s leverage in commercial deal-making, witness the tough negotiations with Rosneft and Gazprom over prices. And its insatiable appetite for natural resources over time could threaten Russia’s position in Central Asia or risk holding Russia’s eastern provinces captive to its markets.
Under these circumstances, the strategic challenge for Russia is to reinforce its sovereignty over its eastern provinces and its ability to defend them as they integrate into the Northeast Asian economic zone. The official strategy for the development of the regions east of Lake Baykal provides the right framework in socio-economic terms. Three goals are critical.
* First, integration into Northeast Asia must be accompanied by two other forms of integration: (1) that of the eastern regions among themselves and (2) that of the region as a whole with the rest of Russia. The former is necessary to ensure that all the eastern provinces benefit from integration into Northeast Asia, that companies and countries cannot play one region off against the other to Russia’s detriment. The latter militates against the risk that economic integration into Northeast Asia slowly pulls the region away from Russia, as political loyalties follow economic advantage. In addition, this latter integration will enhance Russia’s attractiveness as a reliable transportation corridor between Asian and European markets, with positive spillover consequences for the socio-economic development of all provinces along that route.
* Second, Russia needs to multiply the commercial options for its eastern provinces to buttress its control of their resources. That entails ensuring that natural resources as a rule move to global markets, even if some for good commercial reasons move into single-country markets. This is particularly true of energy, and in this regard Russia made the right strategic decision in building the eastern oil pipeline to the Pacific coast with a spur into China. By the same token, Russia should seek to attract investments to this region from as many countries as possible to reduce the leverage of any one country.
* Third, while natural resources will provide the initial foundation of its integration into Northeast Asia, Russia will want to diversify the eastern region’s economy and move it up the value chain over time. Central to this effort should be a focus building up research centers, which can be linked to other centers not only in Northeast Asia but also elsewhere in Russia and throughout the Pacific region.
Along with economic integration Russia will have to master two geopolitical challenges, one short-term, how to deal with North Korea, the other long-term, how to create a stable strategic balance. Russia wants stability on the Korean peninsula, first of all. It wants the North Korean nuclear issue and socio-economic problems managed in ways that diminish the risk of military conflict and of the abrupt regime failure. Russia is not yet strong enough in the region – and will not be for years to come – to cope effectively with the geopolitical stresses that conflict or collapse would bring. Over the longer term, Russia’s interest lies in the creation of a flexible strategic balance, one that does not ossify into a a struggle between permanent coalitions, such as China and Russia opposing Japan, South Korea, and the United States. As in the economic sphere, Russia should seek to fashion a balance that increases its options.
The United States: Managing Regional Dynamism
If Russia seeks to return to Northeast Asia and deepen its integration, the United States seeks to guarantee its continued heft in a region in which it has played a preeminent role at least since the end of the Second World War and whose importance has soared in recent years, economically and geopolitically. A few factoid underscore the economic importance. In 2011, China, Japan, and South Korea were respectively the United States’ second, fourth, and seventh largest trading partners, accounting for nearly 22 percent of total U.S. trade. At the end of that year, China and Japan together accounted for about 45 percent of U.S. foreign-held debt. The Japanese remain among the largest foreign investors in the United States. What Secretary of State Clinton said of Asia as a whole applies to Northeast Asia in particular: “Harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests … Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology.”
Consequently, for its own economic well-being, the United States has a huge interest in Northeast Asia remaining a vibrant economic zone. A key challenge in maintaining that vibrancy is ensuring that China, Japan, and South Korea have access to the natural resources, particularly oil and gas, that they need for continued growth. For all three, Russia’s eastern provinces are critical, while, for the United States they are significant, if not critical, sources of natural resources. For that reason, sharp commercial competition among these powers is inevitable. While American companies will participate in this competition, and the U.S. government will support them, the United States’ interest lies in these resources being available to global markets to the greatest extent possible and in the competition not destabilizing Northeast Asia.
Geopolitically, China is rapidly emerging as a global power, raising concerns in some U.S. circles that it is developing military capabilities that could constrict the United States’ room for maneuver, particularly in international waters off China. The United States cannot prevent China’s rise. Rather, its interest lies in China’s rise as a power willing to work with it on issues of global order, the maintenance of the greatest possible room for maneuver for itself, and the security and openness of the key Pacific trade arteries. Success will depend on able management of bilateral relations with China, through the various security and economic dialogues now in place. In addition, the United States needs to adapt it bilateral security relations with Japan, its most important Asian ally, and with South Korea to the new geopolitical dynamic. In part, that entails further help in overcoming the historical distrust between those two allies as a way of encouraging trilateral cooperation. Those relationships will provide the foundation for a stable regional balance, as they have in the past.
At the same time, North Korea poses a lesser, but still significant geopolitical challenge. For the United States, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a key priority; an opening up of North Korea is desirable, particularly if it diminishes the risk of an abrupt, destabilizing socio-economic collapse. Reunification, although officially supported by the United States, remains a distant goal and the American interest lies in a slow, long-term process that provides assurances about a united Korea’s geopolitical orientation and does not upset the delicate regional balance.
U.S.-Russian Strategic Cooperation
Given these Russian and American interests, where might there be opportunities for strategic cooperation? In addition to continued cooperation in managing the North Korean problem in the five-party framework, two related strategic opportunities come immediately to mind.
First, the socio-economic development of the region east of Lake Baykal. Both countries have a strategic interest in reinforcing Russia’s sovereignty over, and its ability to effectively manage, that region. A major American role in a multilateral effort under Russia’s guidance to develop that region would do much to advance that interest. American companies are global leaders in energy, infrastructure projects, and information-communications technology, all of which should be top priorities for Russia’s efforts in the east. At the moment, ExxonMobil, with its project in Sakhalin, accounts for the lion’s share of American foreign direct investment in the region, but with an improved investment climate, and U.S. government support, Russia should be able to attract many more major American companies to the region. At the same time, the United States and Russia should encourage trade between the Russian Far East and the United States’ Pacific coast, including Alaska (in 2010, the United States accounted for only 2 percent of the overall trade of the regions east of Lake Baykal). Finally, the two countries should consider establishing a network of research centers and institutions of higher education that would link the Russian Far East with the United States’ Pacific coast, as well as China, Japan, and South Korea. While the links could be extended even further, the centers and institutions in Northeast Asia and on the U.S. Pacific coast are more likely to share a common interest in exploring in depth regional problems and issues. These and similar initiatives would promote the balanced development of Russia’s eastern provinces, multiply their commercial options and potential partners, and turn them into a force for economic growth and stability in Northeast Asia.
The second issue is China. No one can overstate the sensitivity of this issue for both the United States and Russia, particularly the latter, given the sharp debate in the United States over the wisdom of seeking to contain China and active U.S. efforts to bolster relations with countries along China’s periphery, as part of the “pivot” towards Asia. That this issue must be handled with great care is self-evident, and it should be obvious that neither Russia nor the United States is going to jeopardize its relations with China for the sake of closer U.S.-Russian relations, certainly not any time soon. Given these realities, it is important to make clear what the purpose of U.S.-Russian cooperation would be.
* First, it is not to erode Russian-Chinese strategic partnership or to contain China. Rather, it is to strengthen Russia’s hand in Northeast Asia so that China’s growth and expanding commercial reach proceed in a balanced fashion that accommodates the interests of Russia, as well as those of its other neighbors.
* Second, it is not to resurrect Cold-War triangular diplomacy. That might have made strategic sense in the 1970’s and 1980’s, as part of a global geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. It makes little sense in today’s multipolar, less ideological world, when the task is crafting stable regional balances that of necessity will have to include more than these three powers. In Northeast Asia, for example, South Korea and Japan have to be part of the mix.
U.S.-Russian cooperation would come primarily in the form of a dialogue about China and the strategic implications for the two countries of its rise (or of other scenarios for its development). To ease China’s concerns, the format could be expanded from time to time to a U.S.-Russian-Chinese trilateral discussion or a five-sided discussion to include South Korea and Japan, as well. Indeed, the six-party talks on North Korea, minus North Korea at least until its satisfies concerns about its nuclear-weapons program, could be transformed into an institution for regular discussion of broader security issues in Northeast Asia. The overall goal would be greater transparency and deeper understanding of each Northeast Asian states interests and ambitions, as part of a larger effort to encourage stable, balanced growth and even greater economic dynamism in the region.
From a strategic standpoint, Northeast Asia will be most stable and dynamic when strength meets strength, when interests and ambitions are clearly articulated, and when each major power understands that it can advance its own interests only if it can accommodate to a sufficient degree the interests of all the other regional powers. A durable, beneficial balance cannot be built on weaknesses and grievances. In this regard, the United States should not only welcome Russia’s determination to return to Northeast Asia as a major power; it should also be prepared to help strengthen its position primarily through active participation in the socio-economic development of its eastern provinces. By the same token, Russia should recognize that an active U.S. presence in Northeast Asia also works to its long-term benefit by multiplying opportunities and options for economic development and geopolitical balance. And both should recognize that U.S.-Russian cooperation could be a force for stability and growth in what will remain for years to come a region where risks and dynamism, dangers and promise, are inextricably entangled.