Press Gaggle by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan [Excerpt re: Ukraine]
(The White House – Aug. 22, 2023)
… MODERATOR: Thank you. Our first question who go to Aamer with the AP.
Q Hi, Jake. So, I had just two questions, Ukraine-related. Russia has reported success in its push in Northeast Ukraine. Just going forward, what do you see as complications presented to Ukraine by Russia’s reported gains? And many of our colleagues on the ground keep hearing the Russians have improved their performance and capabilities. Do you agree with that assessment, and, if so, what’s most notable about Russia’s tactical and strategic progress?
And then, secondly, I was just wondering to what extent are you hearing from U.S. friends and allies’ concerns about the future of Ukraine funding? Is the split ambiguous talk from some in the Republican presidential field on Ukraine resonating with allies and/or worrying them, from what you’re seeing and hearing in your conversations? Thank you.
MR. SULLIVAN: Just taking those in reverse order. First, there are strong Republican as well as Democratic voices in both the House and the Senate in key leadership positions advocating on behalf of continued financial support to Ukraine so that they have the tools they need to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
So we believe that the support will be there and will be sustained. Even if there are some dissonant voices on the other side of the aisle, we believe that, at the core, there is still a strong bipartisan foundation of support for our Ukraine policy and for supporting and defending Ukraine.
And so we have communicated that to our friends in Kyiv and to our allies and partners. And our view is that our allies and partners and our Ukrainian partners have confidence that the United States will continue to be there, as we have committed to be there as long as it takes.
With respect to Russia’s battlefield performance, you know, I’m not going to be an — an armchair general here. I will say that war is an inherently dynamic enterprise, and there is learning that takes place in the conduct of war on both sides, adjustments in tactics, changes based on how the — the other side is fighting, changes in terms of figuring out through trial and error what works and what doesn’t work.
At the same time, Russia continues to face a number of fundamental challenges in terms of its capacities, both with respect to the ground force and with respect to the integration of its various forces to try to both engage in — in defense and offense. And Ukraine is taking every opportunity to try to exploit those shortcomings and vulnerabilities.
The last thing I would say on this front is, given the quite shockingly poor performance of the Russian forces in the early months of the war, they’re starting from a very low base in terms of any question with respect to improvement.
With respect to what’s happening on the battlefield, we have been clear all along that this battlefield is very dynamic, that this is not like a television episode where, in this episode, it’s Ukraine all attack and Russia all defense, and the next episode is Russia all attack and Ukraine all defense.
There is attacking and defending taking place on both sides at multiple points along a very extended frontline of trace, and it is true that the Russians had been attacking up in the Northeast. It is also true that the Ukrainians have been defending up in the Northeast quite effectively.
And, you know, when I originally laid out the rationale for the provision, for example, of our dual-purpose improvised cluster munitions — the DPICMs — one of the arguments I made is that it was about giving Ukraine tools to be able to defend the territory it currently holds against further Russian attacks. That was not a conceptual argument. It was an argument that reflected the reality that Russia will attack in places, and they are attacking.
But, of course, Ukraine is also attacking; Ukraine is also making gains. It’s making gains in the South, as we have seen most recently in the last 24 hours, and it will continue to probe for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the Russian lines and to — to try to take territory in a methodical way while also trying to fight this war sustainably so that it continues to put pressure — can continue to put pressure on Russian lines as we go forward.
So, that’s where we are. It is, as I said, a dynamic battlefield. It is one where we need to continue to move the fundamental elements of both defense and offense — in particular, the artillery ammunition and the mobility that Ukraine needs to be able to both hold ground and take ground. And that’s what we’re going to continue to do, working with the coalition of nations that has been supporting Ukraine since the start of this conflict.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question will go to Vivian with the Wall Street Journal. Vivian, you should be able to unmute yourself.
Q Hi. Can you guys hear me?
MR. SULLIVAN: Yep.
Q Okay. Thanks. Thanks so much for doing this, Jake. I actually wanted to follow up on Aamer’s question. Really bluntly, I want to hear from you if you think this is a stalemate, because that is a growing consensus or at least a growing view among many close observers of this war.
And you talked about the lessons that you’ve learned throughout the course of this battle. You know, if you could get into a little more detail. You’ve looked at the ammunition element of it. You know, what do you — what is U.S. learning and doing to perhaps avoid a stalemate, if you do not believe it is a stalemate yet? Thanks.
And I actually have one more question that’s unrelated, but if you want to answer that
MR. SULLIVAN: No, go ahead.
Q Totally unrelated. With regard to Saudi, I wanted to know if the U.S. is prepared or — to allow Saudi to enrich uranium, whether as part of potential talks to normalize relations with Israel or just in general. Is it something you would entertain, particularly if they do it within IAEA standards? Thanks.
MR. SULLIVAN: So just on the last question, I’m not going to get into the details of the discussions that we’ve been having with Saudi and Israel with respect to Saudi’s interest in a civilian nuclear program. I’ll just leave that where it belongs, which is in those diplomatic channels for now.
There is still a ways to travel with respect to all of the elements of those discussions, and they get quite technical, as you know. So, we don’t expect any imminent announcements on that issue or on the broader question of normalization. But it’s something we continue to work on in close consultation with both the Saudis and the Israelis.
And, also, when it comes to any kind of civilian nuclear component, it’s something that we are, of course, you know, interested in the IAEA’s view as well. So I don’t have anything further to — to report on that today.
My answer to you is no, we do not assess that the conflict is a stalemate. As I noted before, we continue to support Ukraine in its effort to take territory as part of its counteroffensive, and we are seeing it continue to take territory on a methodical, systematic basis.
Obviously, you know, there’s a lot of voices that you have seen that have said, “Why can’t X happen,” or “Why can’t Y happen?” Ukrainians are operating according to their tactics and their timetable, making progress according to the strategic and operational decisions of their commanders and their leadership, and we’ll continue to support that.
And, you know, if you look at how the United States has approached this conflict to the beginning, to your point about learning and evolving, we have evolved at each of the significant stages of the war, from the early phase with a focus on Javelins and Stingers; to the big fight in the Donbas with the focus on artillery and HIMARS; to the counteroffensive with the focus on mobility, including tanks and infantry fighting vehicles; to helping facilitate and enable, you know, a range of other weapons that give Ukraine capabilities to strike both on the frontlines and behind them.
And, you know, we will continue as we go forward to look at what are the tools necessary to help Ukraine make progress, how do we provide those tools on an expedited basis, how do we provide the necessary training so that they have what they need. That’s what we’re going to continue to do.
And, you know, I cannot handicap or predict how things will end up unfolding in the course of this war. But we are continuing to support Ukraine in its counteroffensive efforts….
Q Thanks, Jake. If I can take it back to Ukraine, officials across multiple agencies tell me that there is a frustration with Ukrainian military strategic decisions being made in terms of where Western weapons are going and how many troops are dedicated to the East versus the South, as well as skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to succeed in this counteroffensive. And I’m wondering if you could confirm both the frustration or skepticism or at least speak to those — these — these people who are talking to me about those — those two aspects.
And then, one more question, if — if you don’t mind. On China, you know, Chinese officials telling me that there’s a level of frustration with the U.S. that’s leading them to think even climate change requests are seen as efforts to contain China. And they refuse to pick up Secretary Austin’s call because they’re essentially offended by the sanctions.
Are there steps the U.S. believes it needs to take in order to address some Chinese concerns or perceptions of U.S. intentions, or — or do you think that you don’t need to address those Chinese concerns as part of your strategy? Thanks.
MR. SULLIVAN: We have to be responsible, which is we have to make ourselves available to high-level military-to-military communications so that there is not a mistake or an escalation that causes harm to regional stability. We have done that. The Chinese have not. So, as far as we’re concerned, in that respect, the ball is in their court.
When it comes to climate change, asking a country that is the world’s largest emitter, the largest generator of coal-fired electricity to step up to its obligations to reduce carbon emissions, for that to be described as a U.S. effort to contain China is sort of absurd on its face. And, from our perspective, that — the notion that the U.S. has to provide some reassurance on this question, as opposed to that China needs to do its part — play its responsible role when it comes to addressing the climate crisis, you know, we — we just fundamentally reject that notion.
So the — the course of the past few months has reflected a genuine and sustained willingness by the United States of America to engage at high levels, including to go to Beijing to sit with PRC senior officials to indicate that we are prepared not only to manage the relationship responsibly, but also to look for areas where we can work together with China where it’s in our mutual interest and in the interests of the broader world.
And to the extent China continues to stonewall on issues that matter not just to us or not even primarily to us, but to others around the globe, that’s on them, and I think the question should be better posed to them than it is posed to me.
With re- — with respect to Ukraine, I — look, I’m not going to confirm that anonymous officials are complaining to you about Ukraine. I — that — I can’t say one way or the other. What I will say is that I have not handicapped this war. And one of the reasons I have not handicapped it about what I think will happen or what’s a good tactic and what’s a less-good tactic is because this war has produced so many surprises right back to the beginning.
And I think that the U.S. government should approach the question of battlefield conduct with a level of humility even as we do our best to provide our best advice and then Ukraine makes its own sovereign decisions about how it’s going to proceed.
That’s — that’s how I look at it. That’s how the President looks at it. That’s the policy of the United States, and I can’t speak to anonymous voices who, you know, have a complaint of one kind or another.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question will go to Ben with ABC.
Q Hey, Jake. Thanks for doing this. Kind of along the same — in the same vein, many U.S. officials have said that, you know, it’s natural that the Ukrainians will be moving relatively slowly considering the degree to which Russia has been — has mined the battlefield and strengthened its defensive positions over the winter.
And that’s, of course, understandable, but — but ahead of the counteroffensive, was there a lack of awareness on the U.S. intelligence side of just how good those — those defenses would be and perhaps overconfidence that the U.S. tactics taught to the Ukrainians would be able to — would allow the Ukrainians to deal with them more quickly than — than has come to pass?
And if it’s all right, I have a question for Iran as well. I was wondering if you could provide an update on the deal to free the five Americans and if you thought Iran was appearing to act in good faith so far.
MR. SULLIVAN: So, on Iran, we believe that things are proceeding according to the understanding that we reached with Iran. I don’t have an exact timetable for you because there’s steps that need to yet unfold, but we believe that that remains on track, and we look forward to the day when those five Americans are home safely with their families.
With respect to Ukraine, the — those coalition partners, including the United States, who are consulting with the Ukrainian military in advance of the counteroffensive certainly took into account the layered defenses that the Russians had built, including the fact that there would be minefields in — in those defensive belts and that those minefields could be replenished from standoff by — by the Russians.
The advice that coalition partners, including the United States, gave the Ukrainians really centered around a form of combined arms maneuver. That’s what the Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were — the provision those were geared around.
The Ukrainians have adopted — or adapted their own strategy for dealing with these minefields, you know, based on their experience of the reality of combat, which is always different from the planning of combat, and they’ve adjusted accordingly.
So, I would — I would say that the Ukrainians were aware, we were aware of the thickness of the Russian defenses. But at the end of the day, there is a massive difference between planning and reality when it comes to any conflict and particularly a conflict as — as complex as this one.
So, Ukrainians are doing it their way, and we’re continuing to provide them the tools to be able to do it. And, you know, we’ll see where things end up as the weeks unfold. …
[full post appeared at whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/08/22/press-gaggle-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-2/]