Russia’s Ryabkov Details Problems in Russo-American Relations; Interview with Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov

(Interfax – August 7, 2013) Sergey Ryabkov, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, who is responsible for Russo-American relations and nonproliferation in the Russian foreign-policy department, speaks in an interview with Interfax about the influence of the Edward Snowden situation on bilateral relations, outlines the prospects of a settlement of the Iranian nuclear program following Hasan Ruhani’s assumption of office, and affirms the lack of missile-defense progress at the negotiations with the United States.

(Interfax) Some experts and journalists believe that the chill in Russo-American relations over Snowden will be comparable to the 2008 situation, when, following Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia, Russia and the United States distanced themselves from each other considerably. Do you agree with this assessment?

(Ryabkov) These are things and events that are not comparable. We don’t know why the Snowden situation is being hyped in the United States. It arose simply as a consequence of the actions of Snowden himself and the corresponding departments in Washington. We prior to the moment of his appearance in Sheremetyevo had nothing to do with this situation. And even afterward we tried in every which way to avoid occasions that would have introduced to this situation something over and above the purely humanitarian aspect and over and above the decisions that Snowden himself was making and the choice that he made.

Now the US Administration is making top-level bilateral contact questionable. I believe that this is simply an absolute distortion of reality. This is a view of the world in a distorting mirror. Somehow correlating things that are not comparable such as, for example, Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia and the effects of the perception of these processes in the Caucasus with what is currently happening around this person is impossible. It is strange for us to hear both in the American news media and from politicians on Capitol Hill such parallels, juxtapositions, comparisons. This is all beside the point. We need to be concerning ourselves with preservation of the sound beginning in the relations and to build up the positive aspects, where possible.But striking through some meaningful things as a consequence of one’s own distorted notions of reality — this is simply not serious.

(Interfax) But, all the same, it is not as yet known whether there will be a Russo-American summit in Moscow or not?

(Ryabkov) We have not received any signals that Washington has made this decision or the other concerning the Moscow summit. We note that official White House and State Department spokesmen are repeating the point that the usefulness of this function is being studied. For us the usefulness of top-level contact is self-evident, specially since both the agenda of this contact and its possible results are being talked over with our American partners. We are keeping an eye on this and hoping that, all the same, the result of the study of this usefulness will be what is not detrimental to the relations.

(Interfax) Will the planned meeting in Washington in the “two plus two” format of the heads of the foreign-policy and defense departments be held this week or might it also be canceled on account of Snowden?

(Ryabkov) We are continuing the preparations for the upcoming meeting. Its agenda and sequence of activities for 9 August have been agreed. We have received no signals from our American partners concerning a cancellation of the meeting in the “two plus two” format. Accordingly, we are proceeding on the assumption that the function will take place as planned. There will be a discussion, primarily with the emphasis on military-political problems and arms control, but there will be time also for the discussion of other bilateral topics, including specialized matters involving contacts between the defense departments. The international package: conflicts and crisis situations, including Syria and Afghanistan, will have a presence also. So the preparations for the function are with us practically complete, and we expect a very intensive discussion, specially since there are quite a few pointed, controversial, and difficult issues.

(Interfax) And the Snowden situation will be discussed at this meeting?

(Ryabkov) The Snowden situation discussed? I don’t see a topic for discussion here. The decision to grant him temporary asylum has been made. All the comments and opinions have been given. We simply have nothing to add to what the Russian leadership has already said.

(Interfax) Attorney Anatoliy Kucherena recently sent Edward Snowden’s father an invitation to visit Russia. Will the Foreign Ministry be facilitating the speeded-up issuance of a visa?

(Ryabkov) This request will be considered when the corresponding application requesting the issuance of a Russian visa is received. It has to be accompanied by a set of documents, which are required for a positive decision: this is either an invitation or a voucher or something else besides. In the standard procedure.

(Interfax) From your perceptions, has there in the dialogue with the Americans been any headway made on the missile-defense problem? Is Russia comfortable with the United States’ proposals in the missile-defense sphere? And what do you think about the prospects of further nuclear disarmament?

(Ryabkov) These will by virtue of the very format of the meeting, the simultaneous participation in the negotiations of the heads of both the foreign-policy and defense departments, that is, be central issues. I have no doubt that strategic stability, arms control, and the question of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be the focus of attention in the course of the talks in Washington on Friday.

I cannot say that we are on the threshold of some breakthrough or abrupt shift in the direction of a solution of the remaining complex aspects either in the sphere of missile defenses or in terms of other components of arms control. I have no grounds for doing so. What you mentioned as the American proposals we are considering in the course of my contacts with my counterpart Rose Gottemoeller (US assistant secretary of state — Interfax) included. We have conveyed once again the message that the American proposals that we received this spring would appear to us interesting. This is a step in the right direction, but they are decidedly insufficient for the possibility of a compromise being crafted on their basis.

The situation remains complicated by the fact that the American ideas and our concerns reside in different planes, in different dimensions, as it were, and no points of intersection have as yet been found. But we are continuing the effort and are not dramatizing this fact. We had no illusions at any stage of our dialogue on agreement being reached on missile defenses. The previous US administration did not withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty in order to airily assent to new accords in this sphere.

On the other hand, I want to emphasize that neither have we, the whole of the route since the US pullout from the ABM Treaty — and there has on this route, I would point out, been the conclusion of a new treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms — at all revised our own basic logic of approach to strategic stability. The relationship of strategic offensive arms and missile defenses is for us axiomatic, absolutely indisputable. Without an accord in the sphere of missile defenses which allays our concerns, further steps in the sphere of nuclear disarmament are impossible. We say this openly. Here also is a source for arguments and debate with our American partners. This entire set of problems remains in the disagreement category, is a subject of intensive discussion. We have not thus far approached the line where it may be said that this accord or the other is within range.

(Interfax) Russia is thus uncomfortable with the US proposal on the conclusion of an executive agreement with Russia in the sphere of missile defenses not requiring ratification?

(Ryabkov) One conclusion that we draw based on the outcome of the studies of the American proposals and their discussion is that they lack the possibility for us of an assured judgment that the declarations of the non-targeting of the US missile-defense system against Russia correspond to reality.

Until a formula permitting us not to have to rely on these assurances, and to act to satisfy ourselves precisely as to this nature of the system, is crafted, we cannot speak of the prospect of compromise. And the continued disconnection of positions on this issue is very significant.

Aside from the set of missile-defense problems, the situation in the sphere of maintenance of strategic stability is influenced by a multitude of factors. The task of preventing an arms race in space is very critical. This is the most high-tech sphere, where changes that appreciably alter the very understanding of strategic stability are possible. Progress here also is insufficient as yet, although, on the whole, more points of contact on problems of the security of space activity have been emerging here as of late, and certain progress has been made.

One further area where further efforts are required and where dialogue is as yet only at the very beginning are weapons of strategic range in a nonnuclear configuration. And so forth. The issues that are directly reflected in our assessment of strategic stability could be listed at length.

Unfortunately, we see on the majority of these topics more disagreements with the United States than a convergence of positions and some constructive compromise. This is the reality, and it cannot be ignored. The sum total of factors influencing strategic stability leads us to conclude, therefore, that in the sphere of a further reduction in nuclear arms there are today few serious and realistic prospects, if not to say none at all. Without progress on other issues, there can be no talk about this owing to the interconnectedness of all the factors influencing strategic stability.

(Interfax) Permit me to switch to questions about Iran. Hasan Ruhani has assumed office in this country. Many hopes are being linked with his coming, a certain optimism regarding further negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program is being expressed. Do you share this optimism? Have there already been initial contacts on this issue with the Iranians? Has a new negotiating team been formed in Iran?

(Ryabkov) I do share this optimism. There are many grounds for it. We are impatiently awaiting the moment when the formation of the negotiating team in Iran is completed. Until this happens, we support all the signals in support of the expectations connected with this which have recently been coming from Washington, from Brussels and other European capitals, and from Beijing. We believe that there is every reason for a confident forecast that a new step forward will be taken in the next round in the development of what was discussed in Alma-Ata in the first six months.

The new round, based on the totality of all the circumstances, should definitely be held, we believe, before mid-September. This can no longer be put off. It would be an inexplicable pause were the round not to be held before this date.

(Interfax) It will be held in Alma-Ata also?

(Ryabkov) We are prepared for any options. In Alma-Ata everything was organized at a very good level. Our Kazakhstani colleagues did their utmost in the interests of support for the productiveness of the meeting. This is an important component of success. If now everyone is comfortable with Alma-Ata or Kazakhstan as a whole as the party hosting the round, we will only support this, of course. I don’t believe there will be any problems with determination of the venue this time — as distinct from what happened in the past. We need to settle more quickly on the timeframe.

We are hoping that as soon as the configuration of the delegation of the Islamic Republic at the negotiations is known, the Group of Six will via the European diplomatic service coordinating its efforts here, via Catherine Ashton, via its staff, be able to swiftly present the corresponding proposals, and we will organize this round within the next four or five weeks.

(Interfax) You recently had a meeting with Catherine Ashton, she called on Iran for the speediest formation of the team. Are the Six in principle preparing new proposals? Or do the previous ones remain on the front burner?

(Ryabkov) We have always acted in a national capacity for less of a repetition of what has been covered and a more realistic creative search for compromise solutions. Compromise presupposes that both sides take mutually accommodative steps.

Without going into a time study of the negotiations and the sequence of steps that have been taken by each side as of late, I may say that continuing to mark time around the positions that have been set forth on the head-on courses will not work. The sides have learned these positions by heart such that they fly off the tongue. These positions may be expounded for the other side with eyes closed. For the negotiations to acquire further dynamics, we need to be prepared to have a discussion as to what the essence of what might be the exchanges or some arrangements which, while satisfying the needs of one side, simultaneously signify that the other side also gets something of interest to it.

Sufficient readiness for such effort has thus far been displayed neither by the Iranians nor on the part of the Group of Six. We have many prospective topics at these negotiations, which require analysis and specific diplomatic exploration. For this to be the case, the negotiating position has to be filled with tactics and tactical flexibility. It is in support of this that we are working.

It was largely about this that we spoke when we met in the political-directors format with Catherine Ashton on 16 July in Brussels. We are hoping that the understanding of the need to act in precisely this fashion will be general, in the light of the formation of the new government of Iran, in the light of the important and highly promising signals that we have been hearing from President Ruhani, included. It is possible that the Iranian delegation will be of the same frame of mind also. There will simply be no progress without this. It is very good and important that everyone is currently confirming a real interest in progress at the negotiations. That is, this is not an imitation of some political process, it is creative search. The round needs to be held as quickly as possible.

(Interfax) Continuing the international agenda, are there still disagreements and on what issues between the Russian Federation and the United States in terms of a Geneva 2 conference? What are the prospects of it being convened?

(Ryabkov) There has been some progress in the right direction, namely, when it comes to the crafting of the parameters of the future conference, but it is insufficient for giving some timeframe.

The situation involving the increased talk to the effect that the opposition should, in the view of some, finally obtain access to modern arms, direct assistance — this is all complicating not simply the background of preparation of the conference but also the objective situation. We are incessantly fighting the attempts to put up against the sole possible political process a force-based alternative, but, unfortunately, very influential and consolidated forces both in the region and beyond have evidently made the decision to abort Geneva 2 and attempt to once again change the situation on the ground, which has recently been developing such that military successes of the government may be noted and that important areas are being liberated from the extremists. But this is one aspect of what worries us.

Another aspect is the continuing consolidation of a terrorist “international” on anti-government positions in Syria. The brutalities which are occurring and which only demonstrate how far are the ways and methods employed by the irreconcilable opposition from what is conceivable in such situations show yet again how important it would be at this time to stop the madness, not support these forces from outside, and to focus all efforts on the creation of the conditions for the forum to be held. You could call this forum what you want. It could be characterized by a single word: this is a launch pad for the process of national reconciliation. And the Syrians themselves must reach agreement on what needs to be done in this situation. This is a simple formula. It is easier said than done. Mass killings, which are growing and imparting to all this the nature of an endless tragedy, are the alternative.

(Interfax) Returning to Russo-American relations, have the Magnitsky List and the Guantanamo List already been employed in practice?

(Ryabkov) When it comes to Americans figuring on the Guantanamo List, yes. There have been several instances of American representatives being denied a visa over these persons — I shall not name those to whom I refer — figuring on our list.

(Interfax) CIA employee Ryan Fogle, who operated under diplomatic cover, was expelled from Russia in May. Have the Americans responded to this?

(Ryabkov) I don’t know. I may say on this on this subject: this is not a scene-setting in the theater. This was a serious episode, and the idle talk about the circumstances, why it happened like this and how this altogether creates an odd effect — this has nothing to do with the case because the issue was very serious. This is from the same category as the situation involving our citizens who have, unfortunately, found themselves in the hands of American justice in circumvention of generally accepted procedures, from that same category where the consequences for the state of bilateral relations cannot be underestimated. Some things should not happen, there is no place for them in the normal manner, in the normal matter, of bilateral relations.

(Interfax) Do we understand correctly that, after Snowden, the chances of the return home of Bout and Yaroshenko have been reduced to zero?

(Ryabkov) Unfortunately, such problems, which are symbolized by Viktor Bout and Konstantin Yaroshenko, are multiplying in our relations with the United States. This is one of the most disturbing trends of the present time. We still have no clear idea of whether the Americans are ready to constructively discuss with us the option of use of the 1983 Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. In our view, this is a workable arrangement. But we have no movement even on this issue.

Unfortunately, the practice employed by the United States is utterly flawed and is poisoning the atmosphere of bilateral relations. Enticing and abducting Russian citizens for them to appear before the courts in the United States continue. There is the case of Panin in the Dominican Republic, there is the case of Ustinov in Lithuania, there is the case of Drinkman in the Netherlands, and so forth. This is a source of our very serious disagreements with the United States.

I would like to emphasize that we draw no parallels between these situations and the Snowden business. The circumstances here are entirely different. Each is an individual case. In the situation involving our citizens, whom I have mentioned, a clear trend is in evidence. Snowden is someone who, having weighed the circumstances, took action. And we simply could not have responded to it otherwise. Making his fate or his personal prospects the small change will not now work.

Politically, though, it is the situations involving Bout, Yaroshenko, and other of our citizens that are having a very serious negative impact on the nature of Russo-American relations and the prospects of their forward progress. Without a resolution of the problem of Bout and Yaroshenko, there will be little happening in the humanitarian aspect of our relations, in any event.

We are talking about arbitrary unlawful abductions of our citizens, about the smuggling of our citizens. There is no sufficiently strong term to characterize the degree of our rejection of what is being done against Russians who found themselves in situations where generally accepted instruments of interaction are perfectly applicable. All this could be done in far more civilized fashion. Unfortunately, our partners in Washington do not perceive this logic. This is a very difficult component in the present set of Russo-American relations.