RIA Novosti: Rostislav Ishchenko, 2015: Year of a Fundamental Turnabout
(RIA Novosti – January 6, 2015) The world is entering 2015. People hope for better, but are preparing for the worst. It is hard to be optimists when the year is beginning to the salvoes of the incessant civil war in Ukraine, to Kiev’s threats to settle the problem of the Donbass and Crimea militarily before the end of 2015, and to the unconcealed statements of the United States of its intention to destroy Russia and, for starters, to replace its authorities by means of Maydan techniques. And all this is being accompanied by a war of sanctions against Russia and Crimea and attacks on the rouble.
The US is like Germany in the world wars
Russia has endured. Moreover, Russia has consolidated internally and has been able to consolidate the bulk of states based on a rejection of the American unipolar-world concept. For the first time since the start of the 20th century the resource potential controlled by the United States is inferior to that of its opponents, whom the Americans themselves have called enemies and left with no choice but to become such.
For the first time in its history the United States is in a situation similar to that in which Germany entered both world wars. A more-or-less protracted war was fatal to both the Second and the Third Reichs. The incommensurability of the resource potential resulted in Germany two or three years after the start of combat operations beginning to yield to the adversary in everything – from the number of battalions under arms to the quantity of all types of equipment – and subsequently this gap only grew. However many victories the German generals won, increasingly new regiments, larger and better-armed than the previous ones, emerged against them, and German resources (human included) sooner or later ran out, and conclusive catastrophic defeat became a matter of time, not principle.
Germany entered both world wars armed, therefore, with the concept of Blitzkrieg -a lightning war resulting in victory within one or two months (in some cases, in weeks or even days). The Blitzkrieg was necessary lest the enemy have time to engage his overwhelming resource preponderance. In both cases the West found nothing to put up against the German Blitzkrieg other than the Russian army.
Russia itself rushed into WWI to perform its allied duty. In WWII Hitler made an ill-considered move, deciding that the USSR would be smashed and that this would be less costly than the elimination of Britain. He was mistaken. But for this mistake the USSR paid by entry into the war a year sooner than planned (the Soviet leadership operated on the assumption that Hitler could not begin a war in the east before he had smashed Britain and expected an attack in the spring or summer of 1942) and also with tens of millions of human lives (three-fifths of which were those of the peaceful population).
Russia’s resource superiority “increasingly overwhelming”
Now, for the first time in the history of world wars, Russia and the Anglo-Saxons have changed roles. Russia is waiting calmly since by the day, week, month, and year of biding its time its resource superiority (in allies included) is becoming increasingly overwhelming, and the position of the United States, increasingly hopeless.
The United States is in a hurry. It needs a Blitzkrieg. A while longer, and the resource gap will have assumed values where its confrontation with Russia and the camp of opponents of the unipolar world which it leads will be such that Washington’s conflict with Moscow will appear just as ridiculous and absurd as a conflict of Lesotho or Nepal with Washington might appear today.
This is why 2014 was so difficult. The United States mobilized all its available resources, put all possible allies under arms, and threw all this against Russia. Meanwhile, the Russian economy has only just begun reorganization to a new track. It would in an amicable situation, in normal (non-war) mode, take it a further 10-15 calm years in order without upheavals to untie itself from the dollar, leave off one-sided dependence on the West, and build and launch international structures. All this, as in 1941, has had to be done on the fly.
This is a “war of extermination”
The year of 2015 will not be easy. The United States has not yet given up. It has not won but it has not yet lost. It will fight desperately, taking advantage of any opportunity since this is a war of extermination. But 2015 should be a year of a fundamental turnabout. Not 1942, when the turnabout did not occur, but 1943, when, following the Kursk battle, no one was left in any doubt as to the final outcome of the war.
The end of 2014 was marked by a battle of Moscow and Washington for the initiative. The start of 2015 will obviously be dominated by a struggle for the initiative also. But as early as the summer or fall of 2015, unless something unforeseen happens, the initiative should on the global scale pass to Russia.
Russia has two weak spots -its EaEU [Eurasian Economic Union] allies and the domestic opposition.
The opposition today is marginal, not creative, and small, does not enjoy the support of society, and does not appear dangerous. This is a delusion. These people (the majority of them, with the rare exception, honestly misled) hate Russia and hate its president since he has managed to return to Russia strength and authority. These people are fighting not for the victory, but the annihilation, of the country and the regime. They see as permitted, therefore, a considerably larger number of methods than the conventional civilized politician could employ.
They are prepared to support even their political opponents, even enemies (like radical Orthodox, radical monarchists, and radical communists and sundry radical figures of the left, up to and including Trotskiyites and Maoists). They are prepared to support even outright goons (as was the case in Ukraine), just as long as the goons made their contribution to the smashing of Russia. And the further it goes, the more they become for the United States the last hope of salvation, an American wonder weapon, which is to alter the course of the war at the last moment. They will not be experiencing a shortage of financial, information, diplomatic, or any other possible support, that is.
They will attempt to turn public opinion against the authorities if only for one brief moment and take advantage of this moment to organize street disturbances, chaos in the capital, and the ouster of the authorities against a background of the country’s fragmentation. For them, as for the United States also, this is the sole chance of survival (in the political sense, of course).
Difficulties with former Soviet allies
The EaEU allies (aside from Nursultan Nazarbayev -not Kazakhstan, whose elite is far from united in its choice – aside, precisely, from the oldest and most experienced politician of the post-Soviet territory in charge of the Republic of Kazakhstan), I believe, do not entirely appropriately appreciate the current geopolitical situation. For them this is simply just another exacerbation of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States, during which it would be no bad thing to clip the maximum possible number of coupons from both superpowers while sacrificing nothing here.
Hence the resentment over the fact that in the Customs Union and the EaEU it is necessary not only to receive but to give something also. Hence the anger at the temporary difficulties. Hence the demands on Russia, which is bearing the entire burden of defence of the geopolitical interests of the EaEU as it is, for new loans, concessions, and discounts. Hence the misunderstanding of Moscow’s suddenly hard-line position towards its partners.
Despite all the misunderstandings, confusion and vacillation have not yet begun in the EaEU camp. God grant that they do not. But the need to endure together, as our grandfathers did 70 years ago, is not due to an understanding of the difficulty of the moment but only due to a recognition of the fact that Russia, albeit with great exertion, is capable of holding out and triumphing even without the post-Soviet countries. But the post-Soviet regimes themselves would without Russia fall within one or two years (the United States would see to it), and the fate not of [late Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic but of [late Iraqi President Saddam] Husayn would await their leaders.
Actions of Russia’s opponents depend on situation in Ukraine
The assertiveness of the domestic Russian opposition and opposing forces within the EaEU will obviously largely depend on the development of the situation in Ukraine. The Kiev regime and its American allies have prepared for a new offensive on Novorossiya. They have traditionally weighed two scenarios:
Russia does not intervene, then either Novorossiya is smashed or the war becomes protracted, and here the available resources of the militias will be considerably fewer than those of the Kiev regime, consequently, the conclusive defeat of the Donetsk People’s Republic/Luhansk People’s Republic, after long bloody fighting and heroic resistance, is inevitable.
Russia intervenes, and then it may, finally, be accused of aggression against the “young democracy” with all the ensuing sanctions consequences, not so injurious to Russia as throwing Europe back into the camp of the US camp forever (forever in the foreseeable future, of course).
Judging by the composure and even somewhat ironical waiting of the Kremlin, it has once again devised a third (unexpected for Washington) scenario of an asymmetrical response. Even an agreement on its surprise response for the United States, reached with the EU in advance, could be this response scenario, as a matter of fact (but this is hard to believe).
The hot phase of the conflict in Ukraine has dragged on for too long, in any event, and should be quickly concluded. Based on the results of the conclusion of this hot phase (on the outwardly visible results, regardless of future strategic successes), the post-Soviet allies, the domestic Russian opposition, and even the radical patriot wing will judge the sustainability of Russian power proper and Russia’s prospects of triumphing in the confrontation with the United States.
Russia “guaranteed victory at the front”
Russia is essentially guaranteed victory at the front, and 2015 should end to its benefit. It is necessary merely to adjust somewhat the situation in the rear and, possibly, to sacrifice the beauty, and even partially, the effectiveness, of the foreign policy operation for its dependability and assured victory.
Stalin, to reduce the risk, in December 1942 replaced Saturn, which was strategically the most effective and unimpeachably beautiful from the perspective of military theory, with Little Saturn and in the summer of 1943 he rejected [Soviet commander Nikolay] Vatutin’s proposal for the delivery of a pre-emptive strike against the Germans at the Kursk Bulge.
Any operation provides for a degree of risk (sometimes significant). Without risk there is no victory, he who takes no risks does not drink the champagne. But risk and recklessness are different things. You have to be reckless when the adversary is so strong that all other scenarios anticipate a loss. If, though, the enemy is already weaker, and the question of victory is a matter of time, not principle, the possibility of the organization of adventures may be accorded the enemy.
The achievement in 2015 of a fundamental turnabout by no means signifies that final victory awaits us within the year, though. Judging by the fact that the Russian fleet’s shipbuilding programme contemplates it being able to support a redundant presence at two or three key points of the oceans through the maintenance of permanent assault groups there no sooner than 2020-2021, the conclusive defeat of the United States may not be planned sooner than 2017-2018.
The oceans are not a through passageway. Sea lanes have to be monitored and guarded. It is between 2018 and 2020 that Russia, India, and China will be able to assume consolidated responsibility for ensuring the safety of world shipping.
But this is a matter of the splendid future. Meanwhile, 2015 awaits us. A difficult, but successful, year.