Why Georgia Still Matters; re: 2013-#98-Johnson’s Russia List/Adomanis

Map of Georgia

From: “Hamilton, Robert E COL USARMY (US)” <robert.e.hamilton.mil@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: 2013-#98-Johnson’s Russia List/Adomanis
Date: Thu, 30 May 2013

I’m attaching a short piece I wrote recently on the political transition underway in Georgia.  It is scheduled to go up on the website of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) in the near future.  I decided to send it after reading Mark Adomanis’ piece in today’s JRL.  While I agree with the majority of what Mark says in that piece, there are a few things that need qualification or bear watching:

  • First, I don’t think MAP is in the cards for Georgia at the 2014 summit, no matter what Georgia does or does not do in the meantime.  As Mark notes, the decision is ultimately not Georgia’s to make, and I think there are enough confirmed skeptics among the existing members of NATO to make MAP next year extremely unlikely.  What NATO is more likely to do is acknowledge Georgia’s progress and throw it some other, non-MAP “bone” to encourage further progress.
  • Second, there are a couple of worrying trends that Mark doesn’t address.  On the domestic front, the continuing arrests of former UNM government figures simplifies things for those who want to make the accusation that the GD government is really no different from that in Ukraine, in the sense that its primary domestic political objective is to destroy the opposition.  There is no doubt that some of the arrests are justified, but the longer they go on, the worse it looks.  What I think the GD government should do is form a commission of international legal experts, turn the evidence over to them and promise to abide by whatever recommendations it makes.
  • Next, on the international front, the fence that the Russian forces in South Ossetia have begun building, which in places is some 300 meters inside undisputed Georgian territory, is a bad sign.  It seems deliberately designed to test the limits of Georgia’s commitment to mending the relationship with Russia and will make it very hard for the Georgian government to avoid responding in some fashion, which can only escalate things.  We are entering the “summer season of instability” in SO and this can only make things worse.
  • Finally, Mark makes a peripheral reference to a very interesting phenomenon that seems to be underway among American Georgia-watchers, and that is the emerging left-right alignment here in the US and Georgia.  By that I mean that the UNM and American conservatives seem to be deepening their ties, while American progressives seem to be aligning more with the GD government.  This bears watching, and in a way could signal the maturation of the Georgian political system into one where ideological issues dominate the debate rather than issues of personal power.  As Mark notes, the accusation that Ivanishvili is a Russian stooge grows harder to defend every day and is now echoed only by those from the right-wing hard core here in the States.  What I hope we are seeing in Georgia is the development of center-left and center-right, issues-based parties.

The five months from now until the presidential election will be critical, with plenty of opportunities for UNM, GD or Russia to make bad decisions.  I hope for the region’s sake all of them can exercise some restraint.

Robert E. Hamilton
Colonel, U.S. Army
Department of National Security and Strategy
U.S. Army War College

[Full article follows – http://gfsis.org/media/download/library/articles/Why_Georgia_Still_Matters.pdf ]

Why Georgia Still Matters

(Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS)gfsis.orgRobert Hamilton)

Since President George Bush declared Georgia a “beacon of liberty” in May 2005, events there ­ including a crackdown on opposition protests in November 2007 and a disastrous war with Russia in August 2008 ­ have frustrated the hopes of many in the West and in Georgia that Tbilisi’s transition to democracy and subsequent integration into the Euro-Atlantic community were irreversible.  As Georgia’s transition seemed to falter, many proponents of a strong U.S.-Georgian relationship began instead to focus on the economic and security aspects of the partnership, highlighting the importance of Georgia’s 1700 troops in Afghanistan, Tbilisi’s steady climb in World Bank business climate rankings, and Georgia’s value as a transit country for Caspian oil and gas.

Faltering transitions to democracy are nothing new in the former Soviet Union: Georgia’s Rose Revolution and its counterpart “colored revolutions” in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have resulted not only in progress but also instability and backsliding.  Since October 2012 parliamentary elections however, Georgia has gained a new opportunity to consolidate its democratic transition and serve as an example for the region.  In these elections the opposition Georgian Dream (GD) coalition unseated president Mikhail Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM), which made major reform progress in the early years after the Rose Revolution but had lately been accused of consolidating political power increasingly in its own hands.  Its election victory gave GD control of parliament and the right to name the prime minister.  In a move ordinary in the West but exceptional in most of the former Soviet Union, Saakashvili accepted the results of the election and declared that his party would go into opposition.

The importance of a constitutional transfer of power and an opposition that fights its causes inside Georgia’s political institutions instead of on its streets cannot be overstated.  Both are unprecedented in post-Soviet Georgia.  Georgian politics has too often been a life and death struggle, with the winning faction at a minimum engaging in political persecution of the losers and sometimes resorting to violence to ensure they never again mount a challenge.  Stakes this high make conceding defeat in an election a high-risk endeavor.  Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s first post-Soviet president, was violently deposed in January 1992 by his former Prime Minister and Defense Minster; he thereafter directed an insurgency against the new Georgian government of Eduard Shevardnadze that further weakened the Georgian state and contributed to the outbreak of war in Abkhazia.  Shevardnadze himself left office in 2003 not through a constitutional process but after a crowd of protestors led by Saakashvili entered the parliament building and convinced him to give up power.  In the Georgian context, the fact that Shevardnadze, although finished politically, was neither jailed nor exiled actually represented progress.

Given these inauspicious historical precedents, the fact that Saakashvili continues to serve as president after conceding his party’s defeat in parliamentary elections is noteworthy, and speaks to a growing respect for political institutions and the rule of law in Georgia.  The country is now slightly over halfway through its one-year period of “cohabitation”, which will culminate with the election of a new president in October 2013.  In the meantime, constitutional changes enacted under Saakashvili give new Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili considerable power.  He has used it to seek pragmatic cooperation with Russia on several issues, and to replace the emphasis on rapid economic liberalization – a hallmark of Saakashvili’s tenure ­ with a stress on building Georgia’s social safety net.  Over time, the difference in emphasis between GD and UNM could lead to the development of a Georgian political system based upon ideas instead of personalities, where defeated parties and politicians live to fight another election.  Indeed, an issues-based contrast between the parties is already apparent.  UNM has positioned itself as a center-right party with a strong streak of economic liberalism and an uncompromising stance toward Russia.  GD is emerging as a center-left party which emphasizes social welfare and seeks its own “reset” with Russia.  On two issues the parties are united: the importance of integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, and non-recognition of the Russian-sponsored “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

All the signs in Georgia are not positive.  As expected in a nation with such a troubled political past, the months since the election have seen events that rarely transpire in consolidated democratic systems.  First, a number of former officials of Saakashvili’s government have been arrested for “abuse of power” while in office.  While abuses certainly took place, the selectivity and scale of the arrests suggests they might be politically-motivated.  Next, a number of former members of Saakashvili’s UNM have defected to the new ruling GD coalition.  These events are unsettling because Georgia desperately needs a robust political opposition that acts as a brake on the actions of the majority party.

Despite these issues, things in Georgia are definitely looking up.  While the five months remaining before the October presidential elections will require respect and restraint from both sides,  the year of enforced political cohabitation and power-sharing may hold the key to ending Georgia’s winner-take-all political culture.  Why should we care whether or not Georgia consolidates its democratic transition?  After all, as its democracy rating slipped in the last several years before the 2012 elections, Georgia nevertheless significantly increased its contribution of troops to Afghanistan and continued to serve as a transit route for supplies to Afghanistan and oil from the Caspian to Europe.  The answer to this question is simple: the body of research has shown conclusively that democracies tend to be more prosperous, more internally stable, and less likely to go to war with other democracies.  Zones of democracy therefore tend to overlap with zones of peace and prosperity.  Although, as Georgia has shown, the path to democracy is rarely smooth, in the Caucasus, where violence has too-often been the tool of choice for resolving both internal and external conflicts, a democratic Georgia cannot fail to be a positive development.

Comment