RUSSIA AND AMERICA: A FALSE START TOWARD A NEW DÉTENTE (response to Leslie Gelb)

Putin and Obama with U.S. and Russian Flags

Subject: RUSSIA AND AMERICA: A FALSE START TOWARD A NEW DÉTENTE (response to Leslie Gelb)
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 16:55:45 +0000 (UTC)
From: Kirk Bennett <kirkbennett7@yahoo.com>

RUSSIA AND AMERICA: A FALSE START TOWARD A NEW DÉTENTE
By Kirk Bennett

Kirk Bennett is a former Foreign Service Officer who served in both Moscow and Kyiv. The opinions in this article are his own and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government.

“Russia and America: Toward a New Détente,” a recent 6,500-word essay in “The National Interest” by the preeminent foreign-policy expert Leslie Gelb, was a heartfelt plea for urgent, high-level action to restore U.S.-Russian cooperation and to combine their efforts in addressing urgent world problems. While critical of “recent Russian provocations,” Gelb placed most of the blame for poor relations on the thoughtless triumphalism of the past few U.S. administrations, epitomized by NATO enlargement. The situation calls for “détente-plus,” in which Washington shows Russia the requisite respect, Moscow curbs its bad behavior, and the two countries cooperate to deal with mutual problems such as terrorism and proliferation.

Notwithstanding the nobility of his cause, and the impressive experience and erudition that Mr. Gelb brought to the task, the analysis was disappointing and suffused with an air of unreality. The issue is not so much the platitudes (e.g., “both parties have got to understand that the solution lies in diplomatic sensitivity and compromise, rather than fighting”). Rather, the disappointment arises from a stereotypical analysis of the current crisis in European security, and a cloying faith in the ability of old-fashioned superpower diplomacy to set things right. In the interest of brevity, I must highlight only the most problematic aspects of the essay.

There is a glaring factual error in the assertion that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, ” Russia lost a quarter of its territory [and] half of its population.” In fact, Russia was just one of fifteen Soviet republics, and when the USSR ceased to exist, Russia lost precisely zero territory and zero population. To assert otherwise would be the equivalent of claiming that the loss of their empires deprived Great Britain and France of more than 90% of “their” territory and population. Ukraine, which Mr. Gelb characterizes as “integral to Russia’s history and identity,” has its analogies (albeit inexact) in Ireland and Algeria. If the proportional magnitude of a country’s territorial and population losses were the determining factor in national humiliation, then Portugal would have far greater justification for post-colonial syndrome , and the resulting disruptive behavior, than Russia. The notion of Russia’s dismemberment in 1991 is a myth, and analysts should stop trotting it out as an objective factor in Russian post-Cold War resentment. The fact that this myth has become part of the Russian humiliation narrative, and hence a subjective aspect of the Russian sense of grievance, is another matter that deserves fuller treatment. Unfortunately, it receives no treatment whatsoever in Mr. Gelb’s article, which uncritically accepts the Russian humiliation narrative as almost completely justified.

Even more disappointing is the superficial analysis of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Mr. Gelb asserts that a Ukrainian parliamentary vote on repealing a language law, along with other unspecified “anti-Russian noises,” constituted “more than enough pretext for Putin to initiate the present crisis.” The law in question, which granted the Russian language official status on a regional basis, had been in effect for barely a year. Its repeal would have in no way affected the ability of Ukrainian citizens to speak Russian, access Russian-language media, or be educated in Russian. The law was galling to Ukrainian patriots because it embodied the idea that Russian-speakers in Ukraine need not learn the national language, since all Ukrainian-speakers should “naturally” learn Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication. In any event the Ukrainian government rejected the Rada’s vote to repeal the law, which remains in effect. More importantly, since the onset of the war there has been no systematic persecution of the millions of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, who do not – as Moscow would have us believe – live in fear of their lives because of the “fascist junta” in Kyiv. To his credit, Mr. Gelb does finger Putin as the instigator of the war. However, with a careless throw-away line about “the ill treatment of Russian minorities,” Mr. Gelb gives credence to one of the most baseless lies of the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda blitz.

Mr. Gelb derides NATO for lacking a strategy in the Ukraine crisis, adding that “[t]he reason for the West’s limp hand is painfully evident to all: Russia’s military superiority over NATO on its western borders.” It would have been not charity but simple fairness to observe that the Alliance’s lack of military muscle in the vicinity of Russia is due to a long-standing, conscious decision to assuage Moscow by keeping combat forces away from Russian soil. One is left with the impression that Mr. Gelb neglected this rather important point because it would have undermined his narrative about the recklessness of NATO enlargement. As NATO begins reinforcing the member states on Russia’s borders, it will be interesting to see if Mr. Gelb leaps to chastise the Alliance for once again ignoring Moscow’s sensitivities in Russia’s backyard.

Perhaps the weakest contention in the essay is a line of argumentation not peculiar to Mr. Gelb, but frequently encountered in analyses of the “realist” school – that the current crisis in relations is distracting Russia and the West from recognizing their common interest in solving other pressing world problems. Mr. Gelb writes that “a good case can be made now that these two powers [the U.S. and Russia] have more shared interests than conflicting ones.” Unfortunately, if a good case can be made, Mr. Gelb certainly failed to do so in his essay, and his list of topics for the common U.S.-Russian agenda – terrorism, Syria, Iran, and proliferation – reveals just how little analysis went into his assertion.
The idea of U.S.-Russian cooperation to address global and regional problems is a hardy perennial of the post-Cold War bilateral relationship, spanning all U.S. administrations from the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission of the Clinton White House through the Obama reset. The track record of achievements has been exceedingly modest, not because of bad faith, dilatory bureaucracies or lingering Cold-War attitudes on either side, but due to the blindingly obvious fact that Russia and the U.S. generally view the world differently, and often have flatly contradictory interests.

Syria is a case in point. Syria under the al-Assad family has been a reliable Russian ally for decades and the last redoubt of post-Cold War Russian influence in the Middle East. While the West sees Bashir al-Assad as a bloodthirsty dictator, Russia views him as a faithful friend and the linchpin of Russian interests in the region. Moscow rejects efforts to remove al-Assad not because of pique over NATO enlargement, but because Western and Russian interests in Syria are diametrically opposed. Mr. Gelb’s suggestion that there is, or could be, some common U.S.-Russian agenda on Syria is perplexing to say the least.

Russian relations with Iran are more complex, but common ground with the U.S. remains very limited. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Tehran have recognized their common interest in limiting Turkish and American influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran’ subversive activities in much of the Middle East have not extended to Russia’s vulnerable North Caucasus, a fact noted with gratitude by Moscow. Were it not for the country’s pariah status, Iran would be the natural conduit for most of the Caspian Basin’s hydrocarbon exports – giving Russia a vested economic interest in Iran’s continued isolation. Moreover, Tehran and Moscow are united in their determination to prop up al-Assad.

Terrorism or proliferation ought, in principle, to offer brighter prospects for U.S.-Russian cooperation, but even here dramatically different perspectives limit collaboration. Russian concerns about terrorism are sharply focused on Islamic radicalism in the post-Soviet space, above all the North Caucasus. There was enough overlap in interests for Russia to provide support to the Western military deployment in Afghanistan. However, Moscow does not share U.S. opposition to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, the proxies of Russian clients Syria and Iran. As for proliferation, Moscow and Washington were able to cooperate well enough to remove nuclear weapons from neighboring post-Soviet states, but Russia has been reluctant to support curbs on the far more dangerous proliferation activities of North Korea or Iran. Giorgiy Mirskiy, the dean of Russian Iran experts, has observed that many Russians would frankly prefer a nuclear Iran to a pro-Western one. Putin’s surprise call for the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons came only after decades of Russian denial that any such weapons existed. It was not a strategic reversal of Russia’s historically indulgent attitude toward Syrian WMD, but a tactical move to avert American airstrikes against a Russian ally.

Thus, short of a dramatic change in perceived interests on one side or the other, the popular notion of a joint U.S.-Russian agenda on global and regional problems will remain a will-o’-the-wisp, enticing but ultimately illusory. It is hard to see how refraining from NATO enlargement, or accepting a Russian “sphere of privileged interests” in the post-Soviet space, would have had any substantive effect on basic U.S.-Russian divergences of viewpoint and interest on the issues Mr. Gelb enumerated.

The most astonishing aspect of Mr. Gelb’s article was its breathtaking condescension toward Russia, particularly the Russian leadership. Having placed most of the blame for the current crisis on Western arrogance, and especially the short-sightedness of the last two U.S. administrations, Mr. Gelb does not propose a policy of Western contrition or a reversal of NATO enlargement. Quite the contrary – “[t]he West need not silence its complaints about the Kremlin’s brutality, nor concede vital interests,” he writes, proposing to “retain the sanctions regime and credible prospects for a greater NATO presence” until his diplomatic strategy begins to bear fruit. And what does this diplomatic strategy consist of? It “has to be rooted in what matters most to Russian leaders – their historical sense of self and their passion to be treated as a great power,” and would consist of three elements:

First, diplomacy at the highest levels – “annual presidential summits and semiannual meetings of foreign and defense ministers.”

Second, high visibility to U.S.-Russian joint ventures – “optics are critical both to reestablish Russia’s status as a great power, and for the United States to gain more restrained and cooperative Russian behavior in return. Kremlin leaders are surely realistic enough to see this trade-off and curb themselves.”

Third, simultaneous progress on two fronts – “maintaining the basic integrity and independence of countries on Russia’s borders while being attentive to Russian interests there; and fashioning joint action on broader issues.”

Well, there you have it. There is evidently no U.S.-Russia disagreement that cannot be fixed with a little more POTUS face time. Optics, high-level hand-holding, and joint pursuit of a largely imaginary common agenda, perhaps in a reincarnated Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, will supposedly induce the Kremlin to end its mischief-making in the post-Soviet space. I beg to differ – Putin is not such a fool. The “integrity and independence” of post-Soviet neighbors is precisely what Moscow finds objectionable and contrary to its interests. Moreover, it is risible to imagine that Russia would show the slightest interest in some faux superpower status graciously bestowed upon it by a magnanimous Washington, or would respond with anything but contempt to such a transparently patronizing gesture. Moscow will not give up its perceived birthright in the post-Soviet space for a mess of pottage served up at senior-level meetings with the Americans. What a shame the Kremlin leaders are not as “realistic” as Mr. Gelb seems to believe.

 

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